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CASENOTES 
CORPORATIONS - SECURITIES LAW - DEFINITION OF SE-
CURITY - FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS APPLICABLE TO 
SALE OF A BUSINESS EFFECTUATED BY A STOCK SALE OF 
ALL THE BUSINESS'S STOCK. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 
105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985). 
A father and his sons, managers and sole shareholders of a lumber 
company,) sold the company to a tax attorney and a businessman.2 The 
sale was effected through a transfer of 100 percent of the lumber com-
pany's common stock. 3 The business did not live up to the purchasers' 
expectations and eventually went into receivership. The purchasers filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington alleging that the sellers violated the federal securities laws by mis-
stating or omitting material facts relating to the prospects of the 
enterprise.4 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject 
1. Landreth Timber Co., a Delaware corporation, was purchased by Samuel Dennis, a 
senior partner and tax attorney with a Boston law firm, and John Bolton, a former 
client of Mr. Dennis and an experienced businessman. See Landreth Timber Co. v. 
Landreth, No. 80-2-11740-8, slip. op. (W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 1981), affd, 731 F.2d 
1348 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985), reprinted in Appendix Accompa-
nying Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 
2297 (1985). 
2. The sellers, Ivan K. Landreth and his sons, owned all the outstanding stock of a 
lumber business they operated in Tonasket, Washington. Landreth Timber Co. v. 
Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2300 (1985). 
3. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. 
Ct. 2297 (1985). A business also may be transferred through the sale of a corpora-
tion's assets. This method, not coincidentally, escapes coverage of the federal securi-
ties laws. A sale of a business's assets is advantageous to the purchaser because he 
can pick and choose the assets and liabilities he desires. A sale of stock, however, 
results in the purchaser succeeding to all the assets and liabilities of a corporation, 
known or unknown. A closely held corporation may keep a paucity of accurate 
records and books; therefore, the purchaser of a corporation who purchases by a 
sale of stock may not know precisely what he has acquired. A stock purchaser must 
balance the greater risk of a stock transfer against the ease of the stock's transfera-
bility, whereas the asset purchaser may have to perfect his title in the many and 
potentially eclectic interests of the business in question. See A. CHOKA, BUYING, 
SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 2 (3d ed. 1969); J. MCGAFFREY, BUYING, 
SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 1-6 (4th ed. 1979); W. PAINTER, CORPORATE 
AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION § 8.4 (2d ed. 1981). The 
form of the transaction also may be dictated by the existence of nonassignable con-
tracts or leases. Faced with this hurdle, the sale will be effected through a stock 
transfer. For a painful example of the consequences of a nonassignable lease leading 
to a stock transaction, see Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (lease 
decisive in the transfer of a ticket brokerage business by way of stock rather than 
assets). For a discussion of the tax treatment of asset and stock purchases, see J. 
MCGAFFREY, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 139-52 (4th ed. 1979); 
W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION 
§ 8.5 (2d ed. 1981). See generally Perry, Sale 0/ Assets Transactions: What are the 
SEC's Disclosure Requirements?, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 347 (1980) (discussing a "going 
private" transaction and potential antifraud liability). 
4. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. 
Ct. 2297 (1985). 
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matter jurisdiction, holding that the sale of the business by transfer of all 
the stock did not constitute a federal securities transaction; therefore, the 
federal securities laws did not apply.5 The district court analyzed the 
economic realities of the transaction and ruled the stock was not a secur-
ity within the meaning of the federal securities laws because the buyers 
did not enter into the transaction with the anticipation of earning profits 
derived from the efforts of others.6 The district court concluded, there-
fore, that the sale was not an investment transaction, but a commercial 
or entreprenurial transaction.? The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision.8 The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that when a business is sold by the transfer of its 
stock, the transaction is within the coverage of the Securities Act of 
19339 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193410 (the Acts) because the 
stock transferred constitutes a "security" as defined in the ActS.11 
Comprehensive federal regulation of securities began with the enact-
ment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In the wake of the 1929 stock market 
crash, with investor confidence at an all-time low, Congress prescribed 
the Acts as a means to eradicate the abuses of unregulated securities mar-
kets, to protect the unwary investor from fraud, and to bolster the inves-
tor environment. 12 The Acts have produced a statutory coalition 
5. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth No. 80-2-11740-8, slip op. (W.O. Wash. Apr. 
29, 1981), affd, 731 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985), re-
printed in Appendix Accompanying Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Landreth Tim-
ber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985). 
6. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. 
Ct. 2297 (1985). For a discussion of the federal securities laws involved, see infra 
notes 12-20 and accompanying text. 
7. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. 
Ct. 2297 (1985). 
8. [d. at 1353. 
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77AA (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act]. 
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act]. 
11. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (1985). For the definition 
of security, see infra text accompanying note 18. 
12. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER 
& E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SE-
CURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item 17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as EL-
LENBERGER & MAHAR] ([T]he report states that "[t]he aim [of this report] is to 
prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and 
worthless securities through misleading representation .... Confidence must and 
may be restored upon the enduring basis of honesty with the public. "); PRESIDENT'S 
RECOMMENDATION TO CONGRESS FOR FEDERAL SUSPENSION OF TRAFFIC IN IN-
VESTMENT, SECURITIES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR item 15 
([W]herein President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "This proposal ... puts the 
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest 
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence."); see also Marine 
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 (1982) (1934 Act was "adopted to restore inves-
tors' confidence"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (1933 Act 
was "designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information con-
cerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud 
and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards 
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providing for the registration and regulation of securities. Absent an ex-
emption, the offer or sale of a security as defined by the Acts is subject to 
registration 13 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 14 In addi-
tion the Acts contain antifraud provisions,15 including rule lOb-5, which 
of honesty and fair dealing"); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 
849 (1975) ("[T]he primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate 
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market."); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (purpose of 1934 Act is "to protect investors through the 
requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities"); SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (Acts were to achieve high ethical 
standards in securities industry). See generally James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 
MICH. L. REV. 624 (1934) (discussing the background of the Securities Act and its 
key provisions); Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) (a glance backward at the legislative history of the 
Securities Act by one of its key draftsmen); Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214 (1959) 
(discussing statutory framework of regulating the securities markets). 
13. The 1933 Act requires the filing of a registration statement with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission prior to the offer and sale of any security unless the security 
or the transaction falls into one of the statutory exemptions. See Securities Act of 
1933, § 5, 15 U.S.c. § 17(d) (1982). This registration process may be enforced by 
three different remedies: private civil liability, id. § 77k-L; public civil equitable 
remedies, id. § 17t(b); and public criminal action, id. §§ 17t(b), 17x. The 1934 Act 
addresses the trading markets and provides that securities traded on a national ex-
change or held by more than 500 persons must be registered. See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78L(b), 78(g) (1982). 
14. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(I)-(8) (securities exempt from regis-
tration); id. §§ 17c(a)(9)-(II), 77c(b), 77d (transactions exempt from registration). 
The first of the major statutory exemptions is the non public offering exemption of 
section 4(2). Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.c. § 77d(2) (1982). This section 
allows an issuer to sell unlimited quantities of unregistered securities provided the 
offering is not public. Id. Section 17d(2) has been hailed as the most popular exemp-
tion of all. Thomforde, Relief for Small Businesses: Two New Exemptions from SEC 
Registration, 48 TENN. L. REV. 323, 325 (1981). The "safe harbor" rule for section 
17d(2) is SEC regulation D, rule 506. 17 C.F.R. 230.506 (1985). Section 3(b) con-
tains the second major exemption from registration. Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.c. § 17C(b) (1982). Congress empowered the SEC to promulgate limited ex-
emptions to offerings up to five million dollars provided the public interest is served 
and the investor is protected. The SEC in the spring of 1982 adopted a series of six 
rules, known as Regulation D to fulfill its implementing powers. 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 230.501-.506 (1985). Another major exemption is the intrastate offering exemp-
tion, embodied in section 77c(a)(Il). Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(II). 
This exemption hinges on the offering being extended to only the resident of a single 
state. Id. In adopting these exemptions, Congress believed that investors, in narrow 
areas, required no protection of the registration scheme by reason of the small 
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering. See H.R. REP. No. 
1542, 83d Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2973. 
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 171(2), 17q (1982). These two sections comprise the antifraud pro-
visions of the 1933 Act. Section 771(2) provides a cause of action for rescission or 
damages against the seller using material misrepresentations in the offer or sale of a 
security "whether or not exempted by the provisions of section (c) and (d)" (the 
provisions exempting certain transactions or instruments). Section 77q is a general 
antifraud provision prohibiting fraudulent devices or material misrepresentations or 
omissions in the offer or sale of any security. The 1934 Act's antifraud rule, the 
"workhorse" rule IOb-5, enacted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
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prohibits material misrepresentations, omissions, and the use of fraudu-
lent devices when the security is offered or sold. Significantly, these an-
tifraud provisions apply with equal force whether the instrument is 
registered or exempt. 16 As a result, although a security may be exempt 
from the registration requirements, it remains subject to the antifraud 
rules. 
The Acts, including their plaintiff-oriented antifraud provisions and 
federal jurisdiction, apply only if the transaction involves the transfer of 
a "security" as delineated in the Acts. 17 Thus, the threshold inquiry in 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national security exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1985). 
16. See Superintendent ofIns. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) 
("[W]e read § 1O(b) to mean that congress meant to bar deceptive devices and con-
trivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized 
markets or face to face."). Essential to understanding the ramifications of rule lOb-5 
is that although the 1934 Act is concerned primarily with securities transactions 
issued by publicly held corporations, rule lOb-5 clearly impacts on the closely held 
issuer as well. See section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (giving the SEC 
an omnibus grant of authority to promulgate rules prohibiting fraud "in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange 
or any security not so registered." (emphasis supplied)). 
17. A plaintiff gains tremendous advantages when granted federal jurisdiction. The 
1934 Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, broad venue, and nationwide 
service of process provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). In addition, the elements 
of the federal antifraud provisions are easier to prove than the elements of common 
law fraud. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 808-17 (1983) 
(discussing the Acts' fraud provisions compared to common law deceit); W. PROS-
SER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105-108 
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing the tort action of deceit). A federal lOb-5 cause of action 
is less severe; see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) 
(reliance not a necessity in rule lOb-5 action); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193-95 (1963) (comparing common law fraud to the an-
tifraud provisions of the Acts); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.) 
(improper motive not necessary, just knowledge or recklessness), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 970 (1978); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
bane) (no scienter needed), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). But see Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (strict scienter requirement requiring intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud for violation of rule lOb-5). Recklessness as scienter 
is still an open question; the privity element has survived and must still be proven in 
a federal securities action. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d 
Cir. 1952) (which requires the plaintiff to be a buyer or seller of securities); Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (approving the Birn-
baum rule); see generally Long, Don't Forget the Securities Acts! 26 OKLA. L. REV. 
160, 174-91 (1973) (summarizing the advantages of federal, as opposed to common 
law fraud, as: (1) ease of proof; (2) greater damage recovery; and (3) extended 
liability). 
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determining the applicability of federal securities law is the interpretation 
of the term "security." There is, however, no generic definition of the 
term "security;" instead, the Acts define security in a laundry list fash-
ion. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as 
follows: 
[U]nless the context otherwise requires - (1) The term "secur-
ity" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest on participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, pre-
organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, in-
vestment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit 
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other 
mineral rights, . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest 
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt 
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing. IS 
This definition includes well known instruments such as stocks, bonds 
and debentures. The definitional section also contains less identifiable in-
struments such as evidences of indebtedness and investment contracts 
which are referred to in catch-all terms but are intended to include "the 
many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security."19 Moreover, because the Acts were in-
tended to be remedial legislation to give investors equal footing with sell-
ers, courts have interpreted the term "security" in an expansive manner 
capable of adaptation to meet the "countless and variable schemes 
18. 15 U.S.c. § 77b(l) (1982). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains a defini-
tion that is virtually identical. See 15 U.S.c. § 78c(a)(IO) (1982). The legislative 
history of the 1934 Act notes the definition was to be "substantially the same" as the 
1933 Act. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934). A note with a maturity 
of nine months or less, however, is a security for purposes of the 1933 Act but not 
for the 1934 Act. Reufenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 327 (3rd Cir. 1984); 
Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (2d 
Cir. 1976). As a result, a transaction involving such an instrument thus may create 
antifraud liability under the 1933 Act, although there would be no liability for a 
registration violation under the rule IOb-5 of the 1934 Act. Otherwise, the Supreme 
Court has regarded the two definitions as being in pari materia. See Landreth Tim-
ber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2302 n.l (1985); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 
n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967). 
Despite the definitional sections of the Acts, what constitutes a security has 
been perceived as "one of the best kept secrets in recent legal history. The Securities 
Act of 1933 purports to define the term, but the definition itself presents a Pandora's 
box of imposing dimensions." Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Re-
alty and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 219 (1974). 
19. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975); SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 
11 (1933». 
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devised. "20 
The Supreme Court has addressed the definition of a security on ten 
occasions since the Acts' inception,21 but SEC v. W J. Howey CO.22 re-
mains the definitive decision by the Court on what constitutes a "secur-
ity." In Howey, the issue was whether the purchase of citrus groves 
constituted an investment contract - an instrument enumerated in the 
"security" definition.23 Florida vacationers were offered a strip of a citrus 
grove together with a service contract for cultivation and marketing of 
the fruit,24 Holding that the scheme constituted a "security," the Howey 
Court isolated the elements of an investment contract as follows: (1) in-
vestment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others.25 This tripartite investment contract test 
has come to be known as the "economic realities" test or "Howey" test 
and it is the hallmark in determining whe~her a transaction involves an 
investment contract. The Howey Court emphasized that to effectuate the 
remedial federal securities laws, a workable formula was necessary: form 
should be disregarded for substance, and emphasis should be placed 
upon "economic reality."26 
Twenty-nine years later, in United States Housing Foundation, Inc. 
v. Forman,27 the Court addressed the amorphous definition of a security 
in the context of stock. The plaintiffs in Forman resided in a nonprofit 
housing cooperative. To acquire their apartments, the tenants were re-
quired to buy stock. 28 The residents sued the leasing company alleging 
violations of the Acts' antifraud provisions.29 The Second Circuit, apply-
ing a literal interpretation to the definition of a "security," had held that 
20. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975); SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
21. The ten cases are: Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985); Landreth Timber 
Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 
(1982); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); 
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. United Benefit 
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC 
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 
U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). 
22. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
23. Id. at 294. 
24. Id. at 294-96. The SEC sought to enjoin the defendants from offering and selling 
unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act. /d. at 294. 
25. Id. at 298-99. 
26. Id. at 298. 
27. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
28. Id. at 842. Each purchaser had to buy eighteen shares of "stock" for each apartment 
room in "Co-op City," a privately owned, state-subsidized, nonprofit housing coop-
erative in the Bronx, New York City, at a cost of $25 per share, resulting in a total 
cost of $450 per room. Id. 
29. Id. at 844-45. An "Information Bulletin" issued before construction began on "Co-
op City" projected that the average monthly rental cost would be $23.02 per room. 
The cost of construction, however, increased dramatically due to inflation. The end 
result placed the average monthly rental fee at $39.68 per room. Id. at 843-44. This 
unpleasant tum of events prompted a class action suit by the tenants who alleged 
misrepresentation via the "Information Bulletin." /d. at 844. Ostensibly, the tenants 
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because the instrument possessed the label "stock," the instrument was a 
security; therefore, the Acts' antifraud provisions applied.30 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the stock was not a security and, 
therefore, was not within the ambit of the federal statutes.3l The Court 
eschewed the Second Circuit's literal interpretation of the definition of a 
"security."32 In so doing, the Court declared that "a thing may be within 
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within 
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. "33 The Court held that 
because Congress spumed a literal approach to the Acts' application,34 
the applicability of the Acts turns on the "economic realities" underlying 
a transaction. 3s Hence, although the Forman instrument was labelled 
stock, the instrument lacked the requisite characteristics associated with 
traditional stock. 36 The Supreme Court identified the characteristics of 
stock to include the right to receive dividends contingent upon an appor-
were led to believe that future cost increases would be absorbed by the developers. 
Id. 
30. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub 
nom. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
31. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 859-60 (1975). 
32. Id. at 848. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Forman held that the 
shares of stock were commensurate with "securities" and based its decision on two 
alternative grounds, which later constrained the Supreme Court to deal with the 
question in similar fashion. First, the intermediate appellate court held that because 
the shares purchases were denominated "stock," the literal application of the "se-
curity definition" invoked coverage of the federal securities laws. Forman v. Com-
munity Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United 
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Second, the court of appeals 
labeled the transaction an "investment contract" as delineated by the Howey test. 
Id. at 1253-55. The Supreme Court likewise rendered its decision in several parts. 
Part I set out the detailed but simple fact pattern. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 840-47. Part II was devoted to the definition of a "security" 
as delineated by the Acts. Id. at 847-48. Part IIA contains the Court's rejection of a 
literal approach to the definition. Id. at 848-51. More importantly, as Landreth 
would later stress, the Court found the "stock" to be titular: the instrument mani-
fested none of the essential attributes of inveterate, conventional stock. Id. at 848-
51. Part lIB contained the Court's discussion of whether the instrument could 
march through the Howey "investment contract" test. Id. at 851-58. The Forman 
decision has not enjoyed a uniform interpretation. See infra note 45 for the conse-
quences of Forman's bifurcated analysis. 
33. Id. at 849 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 
(1892)); see also United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 
(1940) ("[E]ven when the plain meaning [of a statute] did not produce absurd re-
sults but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the 
legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal 
words." (citations omitted)). 
34. Id. at 849. Congress sought to define the term "security" in the 1933 Act "to in-
clude ... the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within 
the ordinary concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. II 
(1933). 
35. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848, 851-52 (1975). This prin-
ciple was utilized earlier in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), and 
SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). 
36. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975). Although the in-
strument in Forman was called stock, it prohibited transferability, conferred no vot-
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tionment of profits, negotiability, the ability to be pledged or hypothe-
cated, the conference of voting rights in proportion to the number of 
shares owned and the capacity of the stock to appreciate in value. 37 Hav-
ing concluded the instrument in question was not typical "stock," the 
Forman Court then addressed whether the instrument was an investment 
contract. The Court resorted to the Howey test, which "embodies the 
essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining 
a security."38 The Court then proceeded to apply the Howey test39 to the 
Forman instrument, because in this transaction the Court could perceive 
no distinction between the stock and an investment contract.40 The 
Court found that the transaction was entered into without an expectation 
of profits from the efforts of others, thus it did not satisfy the Howey test. 
Consequently, the Court ruled that when a purchaser is motivated by a 
desire to use, consume, or develop that which he acquires, the purchase is 
not an investment, but a commercial transaction which fails to activate 
the protections of the Acts' antifraud provisions.41 
Forman's application of the Howey economic realities test to stock 
formed the fundamental precept to the sale of business doctrine. The sale 
of business doctrine would deny the protection of the federal securities 
laws to parties buying and selling common stock to obtain control of a 
corporation. The rationale of the doctrine is that when a business 
changes hands through the sale of a controlling block of its stock, that 
stock is not a security within the contemplation of the Acts.42 Courts 
ing rights, and provided no opportunity for dividends or profit upon resale. Id. at 
851. 
37. Id. at 851. 
38. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). That test is the 
"economic realities" test promulgated in SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301 
(1946). 
39. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). The Court stated: 
"The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on 
a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or mana-
gerial efforts of others." Id. at 852. 
The Forman Court revised the Howey test in two ways. The first part of the 
Howey test calls for an "investment of money." Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. Forman 
reconstructed this prong to include simply an "investment." Forman, 421 U.S. at 
852. The third part of the Howey test required an inquiry into whether the transac-
tion involved "profits solely from the efforts of others." Howey, 327 U.S. at 301 
(emphasis added). Forman, however, altered the phrase by jettisoning the word 
"solely." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. The efficacy of this alteration allows a purchaser 
to contribute some effort to generate profits without losing the label investor, as long 
as the purchaser's efforts were not too significant. It is clear that even the recon-
structed Howey test requires the plaintiff to show the promoter's or a third party's 
efforts, instead of his own, were the linchpin to the success of the venture. Forman, 
421 U.S. at 852. 
40. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). The stock lacked all 
traditional characteristics except the name "stock." Id. at 851. 
41. Id. at 858. 
42. See, e.g., Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983) (sale of a controlling 
interest in a discotheque effected through transfer of stock was not a securities trans-
action); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982) (sale of radio station not 
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embracing this view spurned a literal interpretation of the definition of 
security and, in effect, created an exclusion from the coverage of the fed-
eral securities laws. The doctrine was applied for the first time in Chan-
dler v. Kew, Inc.,43 decided twenty months after Forman. In Chandler, 
the aggrieved buyer acquired a liquor store by purchasing 100 percent of 
the stock from its owners. The Tenth Circuit focused on the substance of 
the transaction, which was the sale of the liquor store, and concluded 
that the economic realities barred the application of federal securities 
laws because the stock was merely an indicia of ownership.44 The Chan-
dler decision, as progenitor, prompted other federal courts to hold that in 
the conventional sale of a business, which involves the transfer of both a 
business and all of its stock, fundamentally the buyer acquires a business 
and only acquires the stock as indicia of ownership.45 
Courts that initially adopted the "sale of business doctrine" inter-
preted the Forman case to mean that the sole criterion of whether stock 
is a security is the transaction's satisfaction of the Howey economic reali-
ties test.46 These courts held that Forman extended the Howey test to 
include all instruments within the definition of security,47 thereby al-
within the coverage of federal securities laws); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (II th 
Cir. 1982) (sale of heating and air conditioning business not a securities 
transaction). 
43. 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977). 
44. Id. at 444. 
45. Chandler was important because it implicated Howey and Forman, both of which 
served as the basis for the substantial, but now short-lived Chandler progeny. See 
infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
46. See, e.g., Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he economic 
realities of the case at bar show that plaintiffs were buying a discotheque, and there 
is no question about that."); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 345 (11th Cir. 1982) 
("[b]ased on the rationale of Forman, we reject a literal test and hold that the 'eco-
nomic realities' test is appropriate to determine whether a transaction involving 
stock in a corporation is a 'security transaction' or an 'investment contract' gov-
erned by the Federal Securities Acts."); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 
1151 (7th Cir.) ("[t]he Forman Court applied an 'economic reality' analysis [to de-
termine] the scope of federal securities laws."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
47. See, e.g., Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[t]he attribute of 
a security is that it represents an investment in a venture which derives profits from 
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." (emphasis in original»; Canfield 
v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459,465 (7th Cir. 1981) ("economic reality" is al-
ways the key issue in determining whether stock is a security). Cases rejecting the 
doctrine interpret Forman entirely differently. According to these courts, Forman 
applied a two-part seriatim test; they reason that the Forman Court turned to the 
Howey investment contract test only after assessing that the transaction involved 
aberrant stock. Consequently, if conventional stock is transferred, then the Howey 
test is preempted. See, e.g., Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983); Golden 
v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Coffin v. Polishing Machine, Inc., 596 
F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); infra notes 67-71 and accom-
panying text. 
Courts faced with the issue to accept or reject the sale of business doctrine 
invariably turn to Forman for guidance. The ubiquitous Forman opinion can be 
found in every federal opinion deciding the issue. See Easley, Recent Developments 
in the Sale of Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context Based Analysisfor 
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lowing the Howey test to engulf the definition of security. Aggrieved buy-
ers of businesses thus invariably failed the Howey economic realities test 
because profits would not flow from the efforts of others but instead 
would be derived from the buyer's own efforts.48 Moreover, these courts 
drew a line of demarcation between a commercial or entrepreneurial 
transaction and one made for investment purposes.49 Buyers who prof-
ited from their own efforts were not investors but entrepreneurs. 50 Courts 
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW 929, 933 (1984). One commentator has 
stated that the role of Forman in the sale of business mileau has been reduced to 
ammunition in a "quotation contest." Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The 
"Sale of Business" Doctrine under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 
(1982). Language in Forman supports both sides of the "sale of business doctrine" 
dispute. For instance, the Court stated" '[i]n searching for the meaning and scope 
of the word "security" in the Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance and 
the emphasis should be on economic reality.' " United States Hous. Found., Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 
(1967». Sale of business doctrine advocates find solace in the Court's discussion of 
the Acts' purpose where it is stated, "[b]ecause securities transactions are economic 
in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to tum on the eco-
nomic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto." 
[d. at 849. In discussing the difference between an "investment contract" and an 
instrument commonly known as a "security," the Court stated that, "[i]n either 
case, the basic test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial deal-
ings is the Howey test." [d. at 852. The Court then stated: "This test, in shorthand 
form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions 
defining a security." /d. Conversely, those rejecting the doctrine can also tum to 
Forman wherein the Court states: 
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not dispositive, we do 
not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether it is 
a security. There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name 
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume 
that the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when 
the underlying transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics 
typically associated with the named instrument. 
[d. at 850-51. 
48. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), 
(court unable to find a third-party upon whose efforts the purchaser relied for its 
profit within the meaning of Howey) rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2297; King v. 
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir. 1982) (requirement that profits be derived 
from efforts of others not satisfied as aggrieved buyer took over management of the 
business); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(buyer, upon purchase, took over management of the company making the buyer 
and the company indistinguishable). 
49. Eg., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197,203 (7th Cir. 1982) (establishing a presumption 
of entrepreneurial intent when buyer acquires more than 50% of a corporation's 
stock making Acts inapplicable); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-45 (II th Cir. 
1982) (profit emanating from entrepreneurial efforts of buyer renders Acts inappli-
cable); Fredericksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1148, 1152-53 (7th Cir.) (Act does 
not apply where purchaser places money in hands of another who will control the 
funds and the business decisions), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); see also, 
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Com-
pany's Stock is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225, 240 
(1982) (arguing that although a purchaser of all of the stock of a business is making 
an investment, it is not the type of transaction intended to be covered by the Acts). 
50. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1352 (doctrine's foundation 
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accepting the doctrine reasoned that Congress designed the federal secur-
ities laws to protect investors unable to fend for themselves, rather than 
purchasers who subsequently manage the enterprise.51 This contention is 
buttressed by a reading of the legislative history behind the Acts which is 
silent as to those sophisticated buyers who obtain control of a corpora-
tion by purchase of the corporation's stock. 52 
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,53 the Court injected an additional ra-
tionale in support of the sale of business doctrine. At issue in Marine 
Bank was whether a bank certificate of deposit and a profit-sharing 
agreement were securities. 54 Regarding the certificate of deposit, the 
Court acknowledged that the instrument was among those enumerated in 
the definition of securities provided in the Acts,55 but relied upon the 
qualifying language prefacing the definition - "unless the context other-
wise requires" - to exclude the instrument from the definition of a se-
curity.56 The Court examined the context under which the certificate of 
deposit was issued and determined that the holders of this instrument did 
not require the protection of the federal securities laws. 57 Thus, the 
Marine Bank Court, similar to courts adopting the sale of business doc-
trine, rejected a strict literalist interpretation of "security" and relied on 
the caveat in the Act's definition to exclude the instrument. 58 
The Marine Bank case, finding that the prefatory language required 
a holding that an instrument enumerated in the statute may not necessar-
ily be a "security," seemed to settle the judicial dialogue concerning the 
significance of the phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires." 
based on predicate that Acts apply to investment transactions, not entrepreneurial 
transactions), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985); Sutter v. Groen, 687 
F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982) (same). 
51. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); infra note 108. 
52. See Sutter v. Groen, 678 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982). 
53. 455 U.S. 551 (1982). 
54. Id. at 552. The plaintiffs purchased this instrument from the bank. Subsequently, 
they pledged it back to the bank as collateral for another customer's loan made by 
the bank to a slaughterhouse company. Id. at 552-53. As consideration for the guar-
antee on the loan the plaintiffs entered into a profit-sharing agreement with the own-
ers of the slaughterhouse giving the plaintiffs the right to receive 50% of the net 
profits of the meat packer and $100.00 per month for the life of the guarantee. Also, 
the plaintiffs were granted the right to use the company's barn and pasture in addi-
tion to the right to limit the company's future borrowing. Id. at 553. 
55. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982). 
56. See id. at 556, 558-59. The import of the Marine Bank decision, like every other 
aspect of the sale of business doctrine, has been hotly debated. It has been inter-
preted as rejuvenating the spirits of doctrinal proponents. See Ribskin, Securities 
Regulation, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1461, 1484 (1983); Note, Function Over Form: The 
Sale of Business Doctrine and the Definition of "Security," 63 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 
1146 (1983). But see Kerjala, Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities Regu-
lation Through The Definition of a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 430-35. 
57. 455 U.S. at 558-59. In finding the context otherwise required, Marine Bank empha-
sized that the plaintiff was not entitled to federal securities coverage because certifi-
cates of deposit are sufficiently protected by a comprehensive scheme of regulation 
under the federal banking laws. Id. at 559. 
58. Id. at 556, 558-59. 
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Marine Bank interpreted the phrase to require an inquiry into the con-
text of the circumstances surrounding the instrument, not the context of 
the statute. 59 This reading of the phrase enabled the Court to exclude the 
certificate of deposit from the securities laws by examining the transac-
tion's economic realities. Thus, proponents of the sale of business doc-
trine began to rely on Marine Bank's interpretation of the phrase to 
signal that courts should examine the economic context of every transac-
tion, even though the instrument may be expressly enumerated in the 
"security" definition. This construction of Marine Bank furthered the 
view that, although stock is enumerated in the statutory security defini-
tion, it may not be a security if the context of the transaction indicates 
otherwise. 60 
Additionally, the Marine Bank Court ruled that the profit-sharing 
agreement, also explicitly within the statutory definition of security, was 
not a security because the agreement did not satisfy the Howey test. 61 The 
Court discussed the "common enterprise" element of the Howey test and 
found that instruments accorded security status in earlier Supreme Court 
cases were harmonious in that each had been offered to a large number of 
investors.62 Because the agreement was really a private transaction it was 
59. Prior to Marine Bank, a dispute centered on whether the word "context" referred to 
the underlying context of the transaction or the context of other sections of the 
Securities Acts. A restrictive view of the phrase read "context" to mean the statu-
tory context. Thus, under this view, the definitions in the statutory language were 
to govern unless the language surrounding the term elsewhere in the Act indicated 
otherwise. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969) (Congress 
... cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in different 
sections of the securities laws). By contrast, another view of the caveat has been 
construed as a vehicle to examine the underlying circumstances of the transaction in 
order to determine the applicability of the Acts. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 
200 (7th Cir. 1982) (Referring to Marine Bank, the Seventh Circuit stated: "The 
Court got around the seemingly uncompromising statutory language by treating the 
word 'context' in the introductory clause of section 3(a)(1O) as having reference to 
the economic as well as linguistic context."). In Marine Bank, the Court took the 
certificate of deposit out of the "security" context because of the economic circum-
stances of the transaction: the purchasers were fully protected by the plethora of 
federal banking laws. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982). Courts 
adopting the sale of business doctrine therefore used the caveat to the definition to 
take stock, which is specifically enumerated in the statute, out of the statute. See 
Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982) (intrepreting Marine Bank's 
"context" discussion as referring to the economic context of the transaction); 
Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.) (relying on "context" aspect 
of definition to restrict scope of Acts), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). 
60. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Easley, Recent Develop-
ments in the Sale of Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional Context Based Anal-
ysis for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW 929 (1984) (arguing that 
Marine Bank's "context" discussion mandates that all factors and risks of the trans-
action be examined to define Acts' scope). 
61. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982). 
62. Id. at 559. The control element of the Howey test, the "efforts of others," was also 
discussed in Marine Bank in relation to the profit sharing agreement. The "efforts of 
others" element was not satisfied because the plaintiff retained the right to veto 
future loans and, thus, maintained a measure of control. Id. The Marine Bank 
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"not the type of instrument that comes to mind when the term 'security' 
is used."63 The Court therefore lent credence to the notion that the 
Howey test is applicable not only when examining the characteristics of 
uncommon instruments, but also when examining the characteristics of 
common instruments enumerated within the statutory definition of se-
curity. Moreover, the Court admonished that courts must analyze and 
evaluate each transaction upon the content of the instrument, the pur-
poses of the Acts, and the peculiar facts of each case.64 The Court but-
tressed its conclusions by stating that "Congress, in enacting the 
securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all 
fraud."65 Of even greater import to sale of business proponents was the 
Court's refusal to label the agreement a security because it was the fruit 
of a private transaction.66 Significantly, the sale of a closely held business 
is usually the result of arms-length negotiations between the parties, also 
a private transaction. 
Within the eight years prior to Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,67 
the federal circuits were divided on the viability of the sale of business 
doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh,68 Ninth,69 
Tenth,70 and Eleventh71 Circuits followed the doctrine. Conversely, the 
Second,72 Third,73 Fourth,74 Fifth,75 and Eighth 76 Circuits rejected the 
profit-sharing agreement, termed a "unique agreement," was not traded publicly but 
was negotiated privately. Id. As a result, the plaintiffs were given no prospectus and 
the agreement was not designed for public trading and was "not the type of instru-
ment that comes to mind when the term 'security' is used and does not fall within 
the 'ordinary concept of a security.' " Id. at 559. 
63.Id. 
64. Id. at 560 n.ll. The Court stated: 
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement be-
tween transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a "secur-
ity" as defined by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed 
and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question. the 
purposes intended to be served. and the factual setting as a whole. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
65. Id. at 556. 
66. Id. at 559-60. 
67. 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985). 
68. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 199-204 (7th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, 
Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 
1151-52 (7th Cir. 1981). 
69. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 
105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985). 
70. See Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983). 
71. See Kaye v. Pawnee Const. Co., 680 F.2d 1360, 1366 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982); King v. 
Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 344-46 (11th Cir. 1982). 
72. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1140-47 (2d. Cir. 1982). 
73. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3rd Cir. 1984); Glick v. Campagna, 
613 F.2d 31,35 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
74. See Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 868 (1979); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 
1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974). 
75. Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 497-504 (5th Cir. 1983). 
76. See Cole v. PPG Indus., Inc., 680 F.2d 549, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1982). For cases re-
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sale of business doctrine, treating stock as a security for purposes of the 
Acts without questioning the transactions' economic realities. 
Whether the sale of stock of a closely held corporation was a securi-
ties transaction subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws was presented to the Supreme Court in Landreth Timber Co. v. 
Landreth.77 The Court held that if an instrument bears the label "stock" 
and possesses the requisite characteristics associated with stock,78 a court 
may not go beyond the character of the instrument and analyze the eco-
nomic substance of the transaction.79 
The Court noted that, by the very language of the statute, stock is 
within the definition of a security enumerated in the Acts.80 Conse-
quently, most instruments affixed with the title "stock" are likely to be 
covered by the definition. The Court acknowledged that coverage by the 
Acts is not invoked merely because the instrument bears the label 
"stock," but that a further determination also must be made as to 
whether the instrument possesses the five elements traditionally associ-
ated with stock. 81 The Court concluded that if an instrument is called 
stock, and possesses the characteristics associated with stock, then a pur-
chaser of a business may assume that the instrument is a security to 
which federal securities laws apply.82 It was undisputed that the stock 
transferred in Landreth possessed all the characteristics traditionally as-
sociated with stock. 83 The Court therefore concluded that "the stock at 
issue here is a 'security' within the definition of the Acts, and the sale of 
business doctrine does not apply."84 
The Court distinguished United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. For-
man 8S by observing that the stock in Forman possessed none of the typi-
cal characteristics of conventional stock.86 Thus, in Forman the Court 
went on to consider whether the instruments were "investment con-
tracts" pursuant to the Howey test. 87 The Court's application of the 
Howey test in Forman led to the conclusion that the economic substance 
of the transaction, to secure inexpensive housing, was not the type of 
jecting the doctrine at the district court level, see Sterling Recreation Org. Co. v. 
Segal, 537 F. Supp. 1024, 1026-27 (D. Colo. 1982); Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. 
Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334, 336 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 
456 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925, 
930 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
77. 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985). 
78. For a list of these characteristics, see supra note 36. 
79. 105 S. Ct. at 2302-03. 
80. Id. at 2302. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 2303. 
83. Id. at 2302-03. 
84. Id. at 2308. 
85. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
86. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297,2302-04 (1985); see supra notes 
32-33 and accompanying text. 
87. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (1985). 
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investment contemplated by the Acts.88 
The Court acknowledged that its previous attempts to define "secur-
ity" had "not been entirely clear. "89 This was, however, because its prior 
inquiries into the underlying economic substance of the transactions were 
necessitated by the unusual characteristics of the "securities" involved.9o 
But the Court noted that the Howey test remains a viable method to de-
termine if stock is a security, provided the instrument fails to possess the 
traditional characteristics of stock.91 The Howey test is inappropriate, 
however, if used to determine whether a particular instrument, other 
than an investment contract, "fits within any of the examples listed in the 
statutory definition of 'security.' "92 The Court reasoned that application 
of the Howey test in all circumstances would render superfluous the spe-
cific enumerations within the statutory definition of a security.93 
In addition, the Court marshalled strong policy reasons for not ap-
plying the sale of business doctrine to sellers of businesses who effect the 
sale through a stock transfer. According to the Court, application of the 
sale of business doctrine to Landreth, and to cases in which less than 100 
percent of the stock was sold, would require a determination of whether 
control has passed to the purchaser. If control passes to the purchaser, 
then according to sale of business doctrine adovcates, the stock trans-
ferred would not be a "security" under the Howey test.94 Control is diffi-
88.Id. 
89. Id. at 2303-05; see, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (bank certifi-
cate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement not a "security"); 
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (titular stock not a "se-
curity"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares in 
a state savings and loan association termed a "security"); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 
328 U.S. 293 (1946) (orange groves deemed "securities"); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leas-
ing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (oil leases deemed "securities"). 
90. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (1985). 
91. Id. at 2305 n.5. 
92. Id. at 2305. 
93. Id. (citing Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) and Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)). The Golden decision is particularly instructive be-
cause the issue was whether corporate stock constituted a "security." The court 
stated: "If the 'economic reality' test were to be the core of the definition, only 
general catch-all terms would have been used." Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 
1144 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Prentice & Roszkowski, The Sale of Business Doctrine: 
New Relief From Securities Regulation or a New Haven for Welshers?, 44 o.s. u. L.J. 
473, 498-99 (1983) (arguing that Howey test should be applied only to an investment 
contract). 
94. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2307 (1985). The Court focused 
on the district courts' onerous burden of engaging in meticulous factfinding regard-
ing the passage of control and requesting supplemental facts on the control question 
before deciding the case. Id. In Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308 (1985), the 
companion case to Landreth, the Court manifested a deeper concern for the control 
issue when less than 100 % of a company's stock is sold. In Gould, a case involving 
the transfer of 50 % of a company's stock, the Court noted that control hinges on 
variables such as voting rights, veto rights, or requirements for a super-majority 
vote on corporate management issues. Id. at 2310-11. The key control factor works 
to create even more nebulous inquiries because control can be gained by acquiring 
less than 50 % of a company's stock. !d. at 2311. The fact finding chore would 
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cult to determine and frequently can not be determined until the 
completion of extensive factfinding.95 The resulting uncertainty as to the 
Acts' applicability would be antithetical to the best interest of both the 
buyer and seller.96 To avoid this uncertainty, the Court held that stock is 
not taken out of the ambit of the statutory definition of security merely 
because control passes to the purchaser. 97 
With respect to stock, the Landreth decision represents a clear re-
suscitation of the interpretation of the federal securities laws that existed 
prior to Chandler v. Kew, Inc. 98 Before Chandler, cases considering the 
sale of stock in a corporation routinely denominated the stock as a secur-
ity for purposes of the Acts without examining a transaction's economic 
realities.99 The Chandler era, however, spawned a willingness by courts 
to depart from a strict statutory framework to exclude transactions that 
involve the sale of a business from coverage under the Acts. The Lan-
dreth opinion, marks the demise of those courts' mischaracterization of 
"stock" to avoid the scope of the Acts. IOO 
It is worth noting that Landreth expressly left untouched the ques-
tion of whether "notes," "bonds," or "some other category of instrument 
listed in the definition" are subject to federal securities laws in all circum-
stances. 101 In Landreth, the Court espoused significant policy considera-
tions for finding that the stock transferred should come within the ambit 
of the federal securities laws.102 The Court acknowledged that there 
could be countervailing policy considerations for refraining from a strict 
become increasingly burdensome because resolution of the control issue requires 
extensive inquiries into the innerworkings of each corporation to decipher whether 
the purchase at issue gave the purchaser control. [d. at 2311. With the Gould opin-
ion, the Supreme Court made it clear that the "sale of business doctrine" does not 
apply to stock regardless of the quantity of stock transferred. 
95. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2307 (1985). 
96. [d. 
97. [d. 
98. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
99. See Spencer Co. v. Armark Indus., Inc. 489 F.2d 704 (1st Cir. 1973); Walling v. 
Beverly Enter., 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 
380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 u.S. 1004 (1967); Matheson v. Armbrust, 
284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Special Transp. 
Servs., Inc. v. Baltimore, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 1971). 
100. For the Fourth Circuit, Landreth creates no change. The Fourth Circuit previously 
had rejected the doctrine, interpreting Forman to mean that the "economic reali-
ties" test applies only after the typical characteristics of stock fail to answer to the 
name appended. See Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); see also Occidental Life Ins. Co. of North 
Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974) (decided 
before Forman and applied a literal interpretation to the definition of "security."). 
101. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2306 (1985). 
102. The Court's policy reasons involved the difficulty in ascertaining control, the linch-
pin of the "sale of business doctrine." The Court stated that line drawing would be 
inevitable and every case would turn on ascertaining control. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. at 
2307. Additionally, the Acts' coverage would be unknown to the parties transacting 
business at sale time. [d. The Court also concluded that the slippery control factor 
may not surface until after extensive discovery. !d. at 2308. 
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literal approach to determine whether an instrument comes within the 
Acts' protection. 103 Language in Landreth indicates that the Court per-
ceives circumstances whereby other expressly enumerated instruments 
could be excluded from the Acts' antifraud protection. 104 Thus, Landreth 
in no way means that the sale of business doctrine, as applied to notes or 
bonds for example,105 will not withstand judicial scrutiny. 
The decision in Landreth implicates only the fraud liability of those 
who seek to sell their business through a stock transfer. In reality, most 
of a closely held corporation's transactions involve securities exempt 
from the Acts' regulatory regime that requires the filing of a registration 
statement, prospectus, and other informational requirements of federal 
securities laws.106 From a business planning standpoint, however, the 
Landreth decision alters strategy for those concerned with fraud liability. 
If the Landreth Court had decided the sale of a business effected through 
the transfer of stock was not a securities transaction, it would have made 
no difference whether the sale of business was consummated through 
stock or asset~ because, in either event, the legal recourse for a cause of 
action based on fraud would be state law. Landreth makes it clear that a 
sale of one's business through a stock transfer is a securities transaction. 
Thus, litigation conscious individuals seeking to dispose of their business 
now have a greater incentive to sell the company's assets to avoid possi-
ble liability under the Acts. By contrast, should fraud appear in a stock 
transaction, the import of Landreth enables an aggrieved buyer to receive 
his day in court in a federal forum. 
The recrudescence of the literal interpretation of securities laws, at 
103. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2306 n.7 (1985). The Court 
stated: 
It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already 
discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come 
to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the con-
gressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive 
guidance .... [I]t is proper for a court to consider - as we do today -
policy considerations in construing terms in these Acts. 
Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)). 
104. /d. The Court stated: 
[N]ote[s] may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses 
instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether is-
sued in a consumer context, as commercial paper, or in some other invest-
ment context. We here expressly leave until another day the question 
whether 'notes' or 'bonds' or some other category of instrument listed in 
the definition might be shown 'by proving [only] the document itself.' We 
hold only that 'stock' may be viewed as being in a category by itself for 
purposes of interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of 'security.' 
Id. at 2307. 
105. For an excellent discussion of whether a note is a "security," see Note, The Eco-
nomic Realities of Defining Notes As Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 400 (1982). 
106. R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 11 (1980) (NUTSHELL SERIES); Sar-
gent, State Limited and Private Offering Exemptions: The Maryland Experience in a 
National Perspective, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 496, 505-11 (1984). 
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least with respect to conventional stock, would make more sense if the 
Landreth Court's reasoning had encapsulated more of the ingenious ar-
guments for excluding federal protection when a business is sold. Con-
spicuously absent in the Court's election to adopt the literal approach is 
the Court's failure to consider, as it did in Marine Bank, the vexatious 
five word phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires," prefacing the 
definition of security. 107 The Landreth Court was presented with the op-
portunity to interpret the meaning of this phrase but, instead, carefully 
sidestepped the issue. As a result, Marine Bank will continue to foster 
conjecture as to the applicability of that phrase to other instruments. lOS 
Moreover, the Landreth Court's superficial analysis of the Acts' leg-
islative history ignores a crucial distinction between investor and entre-
preneur. Investors, according to Howey, rent capital and expect to profit 
from the efforts of others. 109 The investor risks his capital in exchange for 
a return commensurate with the risk taken. I 10 Entrepreneurs, however, 
use capital that will enable them to be in business, and more significantly, 
profit from the sweat of their own brow. The entrepreneur combines the 
capital investment with management skills and innovative capabilities 
that will be used to benefit and control the company in which the capital 
is placed. I II This very real distinction is summarily dismissed by the 
Landreth Court in its finding that the intent of certain provisions of the 
1934 Act indicated that the Acts were intended to protect both the inves-
tor and the entrepreneur. I 12 Yet, the legislative enactments cited by the 
107. This phrase is not foreign to statutes. It appears in 36 other Congressional statutes. 
Brieffor Appellant, Appendix B, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 
(1985); see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
109. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
110. Schneider, The Sale of a Business Doctrine - Another View, 37 Sw. L.J. 461, 487 
(1983). 
111. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201-02 (7th Cir. 1982). 
112. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2305 (1985). But see S. REP. 
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (President Roosevelt's plea for enactment of 
1934 Act to protect investors (emphasis supplied)); id. at 5 (report of the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency describing the goal of the legislation as mini-
mizing speculation and secrecy concerning corporations "which invited the public 
to purchase their securities" (emphasis supplied)); id. at 4,6-7, 11-12 (Senate Com-
mittee's Report contains references to "disastrous results to investors" and "tremen-
dous losses to the investing public" (emphasis supplied)); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934) (indicating interests of the investor, not those who 
control a corporation, benefit from federal securities coverage); see also SEC v. Ral-
ston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (purpose of 1933 Act "is to protect inves-
tors by promoting full disclosure of information"); SEC v. International Chern. 
Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 26 (10th Cir. 1972) (purpose of Acts is "the protection of 
investors from fraudulent practices"); Hanna & Turlington, Protection of the Public 
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 251, 276 (1935) (Acts' purpose 
is to "improve the position of the average investor" (emphasis supplied)); Note, Leg-
islation: The Securities Act of 1933,33 COLUM. L. REV. 1220, 1223 (1933) (purpose 
is to enforce "disclosure to the investor of the elements necessary to insure an intelli-
gent and informed jUdgment"). 
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Court 113 were intended as safeguards designed to protect the investor 
from the quintessential strongarming that can occur when there exists a 
separation of ownership and control. 1 14 Additionally, the Court's conclu-
sion on this point precedes its acknowledgement that Justice Stevens, in 
dissent,I15 correctly asserts that the legislative history is dead silent as to 
transactions like the one in Landreth.I 16 The Court finesses the issue by 
stating that its appropriate recourse is to add policy considerations to aid 
the interpretation of legislative history} 17 The policy consideration was 
to make both buyer and seller aware at the time of the sale of the business 
that the transaction was covered by the Act, thereby eviscerating the im-
portance of the control factor and, according to the Court, eviscerating 
the concomitant laborious fact-finding mission that each court must en-
gage in to divine the passage of control. 1 18 
The Court in Landreth properly laid to rest the fiction that "stock" 
is not a "security," and firmly established that the Howey test would be 
applicable only to investment contracts. A much broader problem cre-
ated by Landreth, however, is the Court's imprimatur upon aggrieved 
buyers of closely held corporations, conducting their deals in typically 
face-to-face fashion, to resolve their fraud claims in federal forums. This 
policy issue, essentially a question of federalism, can be narrowed to 
whether buyers of securities in a closely held corporation should be enti-
tled to have the more favorable federal remedy of fraud rather than the 
common law tort of fraud. Significantly, the latter remedy usually makes 
omissions of fact unactionable. 119 If these potential plaintiffs deserve 
113. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2305 (1985). The Court stated: 
"The 1934 Act contains several provisions specifically governing tender offers, dis-
closure of transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, and the re-
covery of short-swing profits gained by such persons." Id. 
114. With respect to tender offers, disclosure requirements were enacted so that share-
holders can decide with prescience whether or not to tender their shares. See HENN 
& ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 820 (3d ed. 1983). Regarding the statu-
tory prohibitions against insider trading, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act provides that 
a director, officer, or ten percent beneficial owner who purchases and sells, or sells 
and purchases the stock of his corporation within a period of less than six months is 
liable to the corporation for any profits obtained. 15 V.S.c. § 78p(b) (1982). Com-
mentators have concluded that the thrust of section 16 is to protect the investor 
from those running the company. See, e.g., Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading 
Under the Securities Exchange Act (pts 1-2),66 HARV. L. REV. 612, 641 (1953) ("It 
is to be expected that [section 16] will continue to be an important and secure link in 
the armor protecting the public investor."); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions 
upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 V. PA. L. REV. 468, 468 
(1947) ("The invidious character of such trading is emphasized by the fact that the 
profit so obtained by the managers was not disclosed to the real owners of the corpo-
ration, to wit, the stockholders, and because it was often obtained at their 
expense. "). 
115. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2312-13 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
116. Id. at 2306 n.7. 
117. /d. 
118. See supra notes 94-97 and accompapying text. 
119. See Long, Don't Forget the Securities Acts!, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 160, 181 (1973) 
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more protection than common law fraud provides, the appropriate rem-
edy then would be to enact a state law parallel to rule lOb-5. It makes no 
sense for federal forums to be forced to deal with the kinds of problems 
that involve close corporation shares that are rarely traded. These 
problems are better left to state securities laws or state common law 
fraud. Moreover, making rule lOb-5 applicable to the close corporation 
contravenes the rule's purpose, which is to protect the investor investing 
in public securities. 120 Relying on the rule's purpose, commentators have 
argued that rule lOb-5 and the other federal antifraud rules do not belong 
amid the affairs of closely held companies because close corporation 
shares are infrequently traded. 121 Because Landreth dismissed the novel 
argument that a closely held corporation's stock, when used to transfer 
ownership and control, is not a security, it is incumbent upon Congress 
to exempt transactions involving the sale of a closely held corporation 
negotiated face-to-face from rule lOb-5. Congress first must make the de-
termination that abatement of federal regulation in this area is necessary, 
that rule lOb-5 need not "cover the corporate universe," and that regula-
tion is better left to the state regulatory mechanism. Congress should 
then pick up where the "sale of business doctrine" left off and render the 
federal antifraud rules inapplicable to the closely held corporation. This 
legislative action would serve to end the unnecessary intrusion by the 
federal government into matters better resolved by the states. 
In sum, Landreth provides a much needed clarification of the appli-
cability of the sale of business doctrine and the applicability of the Howey 
test to instruments other than investment contracts. The practical reali-
ties, however, of Landreth beg Congressional action to exclude from fed-
eral antifraud protection a stock transfer involving the sale of a closely 
held corporation. 
Jeff Cook 
("[T]he question of whether common law fraud will cover omissions as well as 
fraudulent statements is eliminated. It is clear from the language of ... the Federal 
Acts that one cannot escape liability by failing to disclose material information. "). 
120. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 
700 (1974). Professor Cary, an ardent supporter offederal securities regulation, said 
in regard to rule lOb-5: "It seems anomalous to jigsaw every kind of corporate 
dispute into the federal courts through the securities acts as they are presently writ-
ten." Id. 
121. E.g., Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation 
Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 505 (1953); Mofsky, Some 
Comments on the Expanding Definition of "Security. " 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 
(1973); Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 
Bus. LAW. 947 (1976); Note, A New Approach to Rule JOb-5: Distinguishing the 
Close Corporation, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 733. 
